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UMPIRES, JUDGES, AND THE AESTHETICS  
OF THE INFIELD FLY 
Chad M. Oldfather* 
 
In his book Infield Fly Rule Is in Effect: The History and Strategy of 
Baseball’s Most (In)Famous Rule, Howard Wasserman brings the tools of 
legal analysis to the game of baseball. His thorough and persuasive treatment 
provides not only authoritative grounding for the rule but also a set of criteria 
for identifying situations in which “limiting rules” are appropriate throughout 
sport more generally. 
Although his focus is elsewhere, the analysis also bears on the more 
frequently invoked law-baseball comparison, namely the metaphorical 
portray of the judge as an umpire. On this view, most prominently associated 
with Chief Justice Roberts’ opening statement at his confirmation hearing, 
neither umpires nor judges “make the rules; they apply them,”1 and the 
judge’s job is to “call balls and strikes.”2 The metaphor thus invokes a 
conception of law as contained entirely within the linguistic content of “the 
rules,” and of the proper judicial role as entailing a mechanistic process of 
matching facts against those rules. 
The standard critique of this view emphasizes two points. One is that 
the metaphor obscures judges’ role in making and refining the content of law. 
Umpires play no part in the process of changing the rules of baseball. The 
separation of powers in government, in contrast, is not so complete, and 
judges play an integral role in the refinement and development of the law.3 
The second is that it invites its audience to regard the law as considerably 
more determinate than is realistic. The rules of baseball represent a nearly 
complete4 set of authoritative pronouncements. Both the nature of the game, 
in which umpires’ calls relate largely to matters such as where the ball was 
 
*Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Marquette University Law School.  
1 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be C.J. of the Unites States: 
Hearing on S. 109–158 before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John 
G. Roberts, Jr., of Md., Nominee to be C.J. of the United States), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf. 
2 Id. at 185. 
3 There is, of course, considerable disagreement over the extent and nature of this role. But even 
those associated with a limited conception of the judicial role tend to acknowledge that judges necessarily 
make law to some degree.  
4 See J.S. Russell, Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With?, 26 J. PHIL. SPORT 27, 27 (1999). 
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relative to a real or imaginary line, and the sheer number of past games5 result 
in a world in which effectively no situation remains uncovered by a rule. The 
reality in law is otherwise. 
A less-frequent critique is that the metaphor misconceives the nature of 
umpiring, portraying it as too mechanistic. Wasserman’s analysis provides 
two bases for building out this critique. First, he illustrates that umpires do 
not just “call balls and strikes” or otherwise simply apply bright-line rules.6 
The infield fly rule requires judgments of the sort that cannot be reduced to a 
precise verbal formulation. One involves determining whether a situation 
involves “a fair fly ball” rather than a line drive or attempted bunt. Another 
concerns whether the ball “can be caught by an infielder with ordinary 
effort.” Neither standard can workably be articulated more precisely.7  
Second, Wasserman uncovers the unarticulated criteria umpires draw on 
in making these calls. His conversations with baseball personnel revealed that 
umpires “reduce the Rule to two considerations not mentioned in the text—
whether the ball has sufficient arc and whether the fielder gets ‘comfortably 
underneath’ the ball.”8 These provide a way for umpires to draw on the 
purpose of the rule—”protecting baserunners from an unfair double play and 
keeping the defense from obtaining an unfair advantage”9—and to account 
for important contextual features such as player ability. An infield fly in the 
major leagues differs not only from one in a high-school or little-league game 
but also from what would have counted in the majors decades ago because 
today’s infielders have greater average range. 
Wasserman further uncovers different schools of thought regarding the 
process of implementing the rule. While two umpiring instructors he spoke 
to agree that umpires must avoid invoking the rule too quickly, one “teaches 
that the call should come when the ball is at the apex of its flight,” while the 
other “argues that whether a ball is playable with ordinary effort is indicated 
not by the flight of the ball, but by the action or inaction of the fielders,” such 
that it is necessary to wait to see what sort of fielding effort is required.10 
 
5 Depending on whether one counts the National Association, as of this writing, there have been 
either 217,082 or 218,168 major league baseball games played. See BASEBALL REFERENCE, 
https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/. 
6 And even bright-line calls such as balls and strikes are subject to adjustment by umpires. See 
Mitch Berman, On Interpretivism and Formalism in Sports Officiating: From General to Particular 
Jurisprudence, 38 J. PHIL. SPORT 177, 177 (2011). 
7 One could perhaps imagine a formula for distinguishing fly balls from line drives that took into 
account factors such as arc, velocity, and spin, but while such a rule would be precise, it would also be 
beyond the ability of an umpire to calculate within the short period of time available to do so. 
8 HOWARD WASSERMAN, INFIELD FLY RULE IS IN EFFECT: THE HISTORY AND STRATEGY OF 
BASEBALL’S MOST (IN) FAMOUS RULE 24 (2018). 
9 Id. at 25. 
10 Id. at 27. 
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All of this underscores that umpiring, like judging, requires resort to 
inputs and considerations that the rules do not, and cannot, fully specify. 
Umpires and judges alike draw on accumulated wisdom, including a large 
base of experience with specific situations coupled with a refined sense of 
the pertinent values. They must access a reservoir of ineffable, tacit 
knowledge formed and conditioned by past experience. The resulting 
judgments are, in an important sense, aesthetic.11 
Recognition that there is more to the judge-umpire comparison than 
meets the eye does not resuscitate the metaphor. The problem of scope 
remains. The sort of judgments that permeate the law are required only in 
narrow corners of baseball. As I have argued, better sports metaphors lie 
elsewhere.12  
 
 
11 Wasserman consistently references the aesthetic considerations that underlie the infield fly rule. 
I have written about the aesthetic aspect of judging in Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 981, 981 (2018). 
12 See id. 
